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Abstract: The article first examines the rationale for representative participa-
tion, and the circumstances under which it has spread internationally. It then sur-
veys the existing data for representative participation in Australia, and presents 
a case for legislation to introduce a generalised system of German-style works 
councils. The paper.concludes that the first step towards this end should be the 
instigation of a major research agenda to discover more regarding the elements 
of historical and contemporary practice which have accounted for success and 
failure in representative participation in Australia. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years employee involvement or participation in workplace deci-
sion-making has been a major focus of international attention for 
researchers, managers and policymakers alike as they seek means for 
improving communication. and cooperation between management and 
labour. This trend has been the product of broader changes in manage-
ment practices associated with the· spread of strategic human resource 
management, which seeks improved enterprise efficiency in the context 
of intensified business competition at a globalleve1.2 The concern with 
employee participation has included direct job-oriented employee 
involvement through, for example, 'teamwork and quality circles, as well 
1 Professor Raymond Markey, School of Management, University ofWollongong. 
2 R: Markey, 'Introduction: Global Patterns of Participation', in R. Markey, P.J. Gollan, A. 
· Hodgkinson, A. Chouraqrii and U. Veersma (eds.), Models of Employee Participation in 
a Changing Global Environment: Diversity and Interaction, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2001, 
pp. 3-22. 
The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, Volume 20/4, 533-561, 2004. 
© Kluwer Law International. Printed in the Netherlands. 
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as representative forms of participation. The main forms of representative 
participation are works councils and employee representatives on boards 
of management. These are the focus of. this paper, principally. because 
they raise broader questions of governance and policy at a macro leveL 
The paper first examines the rationale for representative participa.,. 
tion, and the circumstances under which it has spread internationally. It 
then surveys the existing data for representative participation in 
Australia, and presents a case for legislation to introduce a generalised 
system of German-style works councils. The last section of the paper 
argues that the first step towards this end should be the instigation of a 
major research agenda to discover more regarding the elements of his-
torical and contemporary practice which have accounted for success and 
failure in representative participation in Australia. 
2. THE RATIONALE FOR REPRESENTATIVE EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION 
The rationale for employee participation and representation in the work.:: 
place generally is threefold.3 First, a longstanding hitman relatiori.'s tradi~ 
tion has argued that employees have non-pecuniary needs for creativity, 
achievement and social approval. By allowing employees a voice in the 
workplace, participation may promote employees' sense of competence, 
self-worth and self-actualisation.4 As the workforce becomes more edu~ 
cated and basic material needs are better satisfied, this perspective has 
gained greater. currency. 
Secondly, employee participation has been advocated as a ,form • of 
power sharing . on the basis of democratic principles.· This is sometimes 
referred to as.'industrial citizenship'~Those who advance this argument for 
participation comnionly favour the terminology. of 'industrial democracy', 




G. Strauss, 'An Overview', in E Heller, E. Pusic, G. Strauss, and B .. Wilpert, Organiza-
tional Participation. Myth and Reality, Oxford,. Oxford University Press,J998, pp. 8-39. 
See B. Wilpert, 'A View from Psychology'; in Heller et al., Organizational 
Participation. Myth and Reality, pp. 40-64; J. E. Mathieu and D. Zazac, 'A review and 
meta-analysis of the antecedents, correlates and consequences of organizational com-
mitment', Psychological Bulletin, No. 108, 1990, pp. 171-94. 
C. Pateman; Participation and Democratic Theory, Cambridge University Press, New 
York, 1970; R. · Dahl, A Preface To Economic Democracy,, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
University of California Press, 1985; J. Rogers, 'United States: Lessons from Abroad and 
Home', in J. Rogers and W. Streeck ( eds. ), TfOrks Councils. Consultation,· Representation, 
and Cooperation in Industrial Relations, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1995, 
pp. 381-83; W. Streeck, 'Works Councils in Europe: From Consultation to Participation', 
in ibid., pp. 321-43; R Wood (ed.), Proceedings of the Internatiqnal Conference on 
Industrial Democracy, Adelaide, Sydney, CCH Australia, 1978, pp. 216-49. 
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.Qn the left of the political spectrum, 'workers' control' extends indus-
trial democracy to \the polar opposite of managerial prerogative.6 Both of 
the hroad rationales described here refer to 'empowerment' of employees 
through participation. 
Thirdly, the case for employee participation has been based upon the 
argument that ·it contributes substantially to organisational efficiency.· An 
extensive literature has argued that employee participation has the capac-
. ity to enhance the quality ofdecision-making by broadening the inputs, 
promotes commitment to the outcomes of the decision-making process, 
improves motivation, communications and cooperation in the workplace; 
may reduce the workload of supervisors, encourages skills development in 
the workforce, and can contribute to improved employee/employer rela-
tions generally in the workplace.7 These arguments represent a reaction 
against Fordist mass production technologies, and their tendency to deskill 
employees. Some researchers argue that employee participation·· and 
empowerment are progressive management practices which have univer-
sal benefits to performance enhancement, as opposed to most other HRM 
practices whose success. is contingent upon the organisational context. 8 
. Historically, the· main appeal for employee participation has shifted 
between the three broad rationales referred to above, reflecting shifts in 
economic circumstances and the balance of power between capital and 
labour. Humanistic and power-sharing arguments were dominant in the 
6 E. Kardelj, Self-Management •and the Political System, Belgrade, 1980; N. Pasic, 
S. Grozdanic and M. Radevic (eds.), Wt:Jrkers' Management in ·Yugoslavia .. Recent 
Developments and Trends, Geneva, ILO, 1982; J. Vanek, The General Theory ofLabor-
Managed Market Economics, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1971. 
7 See M;Aoki, 'Toward an Economic Modd of the Japanese Firm', Journal of Economic 
Literature, No. 28, 1990, pp .. 1-27; Report and Recommendations of the Commission on 
the Future of: Worker-Management Relations, (Dunlop Commission). chaired by 
J. Dunlop, Washington. DC, US Department of Labor and Department· of Commerce, 
1994, Section II; R. B. Freeman, and E. P. Lazear, 'An Economic Analysis of Works 
Councils', in Rogers Streeck, Works Council, pp. 27-52; Rogers; 'United States: 
Lessons from Abroad and Home', pp. 383-89; Streeck, 'Works Councils in Europe: 
From Consultation to Participation', pp. 343-46; J. Meyer, and L. Topolnytsky, 
'Building and maintaining employee commitment: implications for HRM policy and 
practice', in A. Travaglione and V. Marshall (eds.), Human Resource Strategies: An 
Applied Approach, Sydney, McGraw-Hill, 2000, pp. 335-66; R. Markey and J. Monat 
(eds.),Innovation and Employee Participation Through Wt:Jrks Councils. International 
Case Studies; Aldershot, Avebury, 1997, pp. 6-7, 415-16; K. I. Miller and P. R. Monge, 
'Participation, Satisfaction, and Productivity: A Meta-Analytical Review', Academy of 
Management Jounial, Vol. 29, No. 4, 1986; pp. 727-53 .. 
8 J.B. Arthur, 'Effects of Human Resource Systems on·Manufacturing·Performance and 
Turnover', Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 37, No. 3, 1994, pp: 670-687; 
J. T. Delaney and M.A. Huselid; 'The Impact of Human Resource Management Practices 
on Perceptions of Organisational Performance', Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 
39, No: 4, 1996, pp; 949-969. · 
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1960s and 1970s, particularly in the context of worker militancy and eco-
nomic buoyancy.9 However, organisational efficiency. has provided.the 
strongest base for promotion of employee participation since the 1980s. 
This shift has occurred in a context of intensified competition in a glob-
alised economic environment, the dominance of economic rationalism in 
public policy, and the tipping of the balance of power in favour of 
employers, especially as union membership has declined.IO It is notable 
that in Germany, where works councils were strengthened by legislation 
in 2001, they are attributed with a major share of the responsibility for 
the efficiency and competitiveness of German firms.ll 
These general rationales for employee involvement apply both to 
direct and representative forms: however, representative participation 
attracts its own supporting arguments. With the decline of trade union 
membership and consequent weakening of unionism as a form of collec-
tive representation and employee voice in many countries, the importance 
of representative institutions such as works councils has taken on new 
significance in recent years, filling, or. potentially filling, .a .collective 
'representation gap' in the workplace. Representative participation 
through works councils or employee representatives. on boards· also has 
become a consideration in the growing international concern with corpo-
rate governance which has emerged as a result of a series of major cor-
porate failures since the late 1980s, the most spectacular recent examples 
being Enron and WorldCom. 
Until recently the corporate governance debate had focused upon 
strengthening the position of the shareholders, but these comprise only 
one ofthe stakeholders involved: 
The specific orientation on shareholders' interests (and share-
holder value) carries the risk of a too one-sided focus on- main-
ly short term - results and the value of the shares. The share-
holder model does not allow sufficiently for other interests such 
as those of the employees or the environment. A too one-sided 
9 A. Bullock, Report. of the Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy, London, 
HMSO, 1977; C. Crouch and A. Pizzorno, The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western 
Europe since 1968, New York, Holmes and Meir, 1978; Wood, Proceedings of the 
International Conference. 
10 Markey, 'Introduction: Global Patterns of Participation', pp . .3-22; Strauss, 'An Over-
view', p. 9. 
11 Eironline (1998/06), 'Report assesses eo-determination and recommends modernisa-
tion', eironline (website of the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions), <http:/ /www.eiro.eurofound.ie/1998/06>. 
' 
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focus on profitability may adversely affect the attention for the 
longer-term policy and the company's future, not to mention the 
social responsibility of the company.I2 
537 
In his preface ·to the World Bank publication, Corporate Governance: 
A Framework for Implementation, Sir Adrian Cadbury recognised a broad-
er range of stakeholders, including employees, customers and communi-
ty.l3 In the 'stakeholder-model' of corporate governance, the employees' 
representatives 'play an active role- as participants- in corporate gover-
nance, in the process of strategic, decision-making at corporate level' ,14 
With the continuous· process of mergers, take-overs, reorganisations, 
downsizing and internationalisation of companies and the growing global 
character of business, the issue has assumed growing importance. 
In the states of central and eastern Europe the issue of employee par-
ticipation in corporate governance has had particular salience ·during a 
transformation process from centrally-planned to. market economies in 
the past decade or more. These states have grappled with the dual issues 
of constructing private enterprise firms with a capital base as well as new 
industrial relations systems. The two issues often overlapped, with 
employees receiving privileged access to company shares and participat-
ing in new forms of collective representation through works councils 
and/or trade unions, in addition to employee representation on boards of 
management. IS 
3. THE INTERNATIONALISATION·OF REPRESENTATIVE PARTICIPATION 
PRACTICES 
Against this background, the incidence and range of representative partic-
ipation has expanded substantially. In Germany the works council system 
12 R. Goodijk, 'Corporate Governance and Workers' Participation in the Netherlands', in 
Markey et al., Models of Employee Participation, p. 181. 
13 World Bank, Corporate Governance: A Framework for Implementation, New York, 1999. 
14 R. Goodijk, op.•cit., p. 180; also J. Hill, 'Corporate governance and the role of the 
employee', in P. J. Gollan and G. Patmore (eds.), Partnership at work:.The challenge of 
employee democracy. Labor Essays 2003, Sydney, Pluto Press, 2003, pp. 110-121. 
15 C. Kollonay-Lehoczky, 'The emergence of new forms of workers' participation in central 
and eastern European countries', in Markey and Monat, Innovation and Employee 
Participation. Through . Works. Councils, pp., .169-89; K. Konecki, and. J. Kulpiiiska, 
'Employee participation in privatised and private firm: the Polish experience', in Markey 
. and Monat, Innovation and Employee Participation Through Works Councils, pp. 231-42; 
B. Kavcic, · 'Slovenia: from self-management to eo-determination'; in Markey and Monat, 
Innovation and Employee Participation Through TfOrks Councils, pp. 210-30. , 
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was extended by reform legislation of June 2001 ,16 From the mid-1990s 
multinational European Works Councils (EWCs) have slowly .begun to 
establish themselves in the European Union (EU) and European Economic 
Area (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway in addition to the EU countries) 
as a result of the 1994 EWC Directive of the EU. Of more than:1800 multi-
national companies estimated to be affected by the EWC. Directive, 639 
have concluded agreements for establishing EWCs, .negotiations in a fur-
ther 150 were still underway in 2003, and a further 40 voluntary EWC 
agreements had been reached prior to. the 1994 Directive)?. Since the 
implementation of the Directive greater. numbers of companies have been 
brought under. its purview. by the enlargement of the. EU • to 25 ·member 
states (note the impact in central and eastern Europe already). IS. Coverage 
also expanded when Britain acceded to the Directive at the end of 1997 ~ · 
· Two further measures of the EU provide support for EWCs and other 
forms ofrepresentative·participation. Late in 2001 a European Company 
Statute was adopted, to provide companies with the option of forming a 
European Company...,.. 'Societas Europeae'. (SE). These are able to func-
tion on a European-wide basis governed by EUJaw, which· facilitates 
mergers and multinational.operations under a uniform set of rules for 
management .and reporting. systems. The creation of a European 
Company requires negotiations for employee participation:with a body, 
such as a works council or trade union, representing all employees in the 
companies involved. Failing agreement, a standard set of. principles 
require regular reporting to and consultation with a body representing 
employees, concerning business plans, production and sales levels, 
restructuring and retrenchments.19 This was followed early in 2002 by the 
/! 
16 . Eiron1ine, 'Reform of Works Constitution Act proposed', Eir~nline, 'Government adopts 
draft bill on reform of Works Constitution Act', Eironline, <http:// ww\V.eiro.euro-
found.ie/2001/02>; Eironline, 'Government adopts draft bill on reform of Works 
Constitution Act', eironline, http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie/2001/03; eironline, ·'Works 
Constitution Act reform adopted', Eironline, <http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie/ 2001/07>. 
17 J. Waddington and P. Kerckhofs, 'European Works Councils: what is the current state of 
play?', Transfer. European Review of Labour and Research, Vol. 9, ·No.· 2, Summer 
2003; pp. 324-25; H. Platzer, S. Riib and K. Weiner, 'European Works Couricils-Article 
6 agreements: quantitative and qualitative developments', Transfer, Vol. ·7, No. 1, 
Spring, 2001, pp. 90-94; P. Cressey, 'Transnational works councils and macro European 
developments', in Markey and Monat, Innovation and Employee Participation Through 
TfOrks Councils, pp. 37-38. · 
18 H; Kohl and H. Platzer, 'Labour relations in central and eastern· Europe and the 
European social model', Transfer, Spring 2003, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 11-30.·· 
19 Europa, 'The European Company- Frequently Asked Questions', Europa, <http:// 
europa.eu.int/comm/internal/en/company/company/news/01-314>,· 2001; K .. O'Kelly, 
'The European Company Statute', paper ·presented to Workers' ·Participation· Study 
Group, International Industrial Relations Association European Congress, Oslo, 2001. 
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Information and Consultation Directive, that obliges all businesses with 
over 50 employees to implement genuine.consultation of their employees 
prior to all major decisions, particularly.ifthey affectjobs:Later that year 
a draft Directive on information and consultation in relation to company 
takeovers was also adopted.2o 
It" is important to note that multinationals based outside the EU, in 
Japan and the USA; .for example, are subject to the EWC Directive for 
their EU operations.: Indeed, a quarter of multinationals covered by the 
Directive are based outside the EU, and of these 61 per cent are based in 
the US, i.e. 15 per cent of all multinationals affected.2L Similarly, even 
before Britain was· covered by the· EWC • Directive, many British-based 
firms were subject to it for their continental European operations, so long 
as. they. fulfilled the relevant threshold criteria: over 1,000 employees· in 
the EU, and establishments employing 150 employees in at least two EU 
countries (outside the UK) The Trades Union Congress estimated in 1994 
that. 102 British firms were. affected in this .way. For this reason some 
British and overseas-based firms with obligations to form EWCs based 
on continental European operations extended coverage to British workers 
anyway,·because to exclude them from an existing structure would be dis-
criminatory.22 It seems that a similar rationale may now be taking effect 
with firms subject to the EWC Directive, but also employing substantial 
workforces outside the EU. At least two major multinationals- SKF (the 
Swedish-based ball-bearing manufacturer) and Volkswagen - have 
extended their EWCs into World .Works Councils (WWCs) covering 
employees in Asia, South Africa and South America.23 These are based 
upon voluntary agreements with relevant unions, rather. than . any ·legal 
obligation, with the International Metalworkers' Federation playing a 
major initiating role. ·Based on the EWC model, an employer representa.:. 
tive at the 4th Regional Asian International Industrial Relations 
Association Congress in Manila in November 2001 called for the estab-
20 Europa, 'New Worker Information and Consultation Directive a 'modern business tool', 
says Commission', Europa, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/news/ 
2002/jan/0 11_en>; Eironline 'Final approval given to consultation Directive', Eironline, 
<http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie/2002/04>. 
Eironline,. 'Commission makes new proposal for takeovers Directive', Eironline, 
<http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie/2002/011>. 
21 · Waddington and Kerckhofs, ·'European Works,Councils: whaUs the current state of 
·.play?', pp. 325-26. . 
22 Cressey, 'Transnational works councils and macro European developments', pp. 38-39. 
23 R. Steiert, .'European Works Councils, World Works Councils and the liaison role of the 
trade unions: a test of international union policy', Transfer, Vol. 7, No. 1; Spring, 2001, 
pp. 114-31. 
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lishment of Asian Works Councils. The increased momentum of market 
(including labour market) globalisation and international mergers in 
recent years provides considerable incentive for the globalisation, of 
participative and consultative practices, especially. from the employees' 
perspective. 
The recent European experience built on strong foundations. Prior to 
the EWCs, most EU countries, and;a number outside the EU, had well-
established systems of works councils, through which employee repre-
sentatives are informed or consulted on management decisions, or even 
participate in decision-making ( codetermination). These workplace rep-
resentative organs have mainly been introduced by legislation, which 
varies considerably between countries. The most substantial instances, in 
terms of consultative and . codetermination rights, have been in 
Scandinavia and Germany. The Swedish model is based on workplace 
trade union clubs as the basis of workplace participation and consulta-
tion, whereas the German model is based upon statutory works councils 
with defined powers and roles separate from those of trade unions. Two-
thirds of EU member states, and a number of European countries outside 
the EU, also have statutory board-level representation for employees. As 
with works councils, these structures vary considerably in terms of the 
size threshold of companies, level of employee representation; or even 
the sector in which they apply. In the 'Rhineland' countries (Germany, 
Austria, the Netherlands) and Denmark, companies operate with a dual 
structure of supervisory and management boards, and on the German 
supervisory boards there is full parity representation.24 
This European model of representative participation, in its various 
forms, has underlain the EU-wide developments of recent years. As we 
have seen, its influence is also reaching beyond Europe. What is its rele-
vance for Australia? 
24 H. Knudsen, Employee Participation in Europe, London, Sage, 1995, chs. 2, 4, 5 and 6; 
Rogers and Streeck, TfOrks Councils, various contributions; P. Auer, •eo-determination 
in Germany: Institutional Stability in a Changing Environment', in E. David and R. 
Lansbury (eds.), Managing Together. Consultation and Participation in the TfOrkplace, 
Melbourne, Longman, 1996, pp. 160-72; C. Berggren, 'Sweden: A Fragile but still 
Innovative System', in ibid., pp. 193-207; R. Blanpain, 'Management Initiatives and 
Rights to Information, Consultation and Workers' Participation in the EC Countries', 
BCLR, No. 27, 1993, pp. 25-41. 
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4. AUSTRALIAN REPRESENTATIVE PARTICIPATION AT THE WORKPLACE 
As with other English-speaking countries such as the US and UK, 
Australian representative employee participation other than through trade 
. unions has been less substantially institutionalised than in western 
Europe. In Australia and the English-speaking countries generally, no 
legislation exists for works councils or employee representatives on 
boards. Joint consultative committees (JCCs) are the nearest equivalent 
to works councils, and the most common form of representative employ-
ee participation, but employee representation on boards also occurs in 
some firms.2s 
4.1. Joint Consultative Committees (JCCs) 
JCCs differ from statutory works councils in that they are usually the 
product of unilateral management initiative or of union/management 
agreement. They also .vary considerably in terms of composition, juris-
diction, powers and organisational level of operation. They commonly 
include up to 50 per cent managers, as well as employee representatives. 
The latter are , sometimes · appointed by management, sometimes by 
unions or a combination of the two, and seem to be less commonly elect-
ed directly by employees. JCCs usually have a purely advisory role to 
management, are often restricted in their jurisdiction to a narrow range of 
issues, and often have specific briefs for a limited period of time (task 
forces).26 British data shows a similar pattem,27 
JCCs received encouragement in Australia from the restructuring 
and structural· efficiency guidelines· adopted by the Australian· Industrial 
Relations Commissionjn 1988/9. From 1990 to 1995 the proportion of 
25 For the USA, see G. Strauss, 'American Experience with Union-Nominated Boards of 
Directors', in Markey et al. Models of Employee Participation, pp: 97-118; T. Donahue, 
'Emerging models of employee participation and representation in the US', in Markey 
and Monat, Innovation and Employee Participation Through Works Councils, pp. 272-
79; G. Strauss, 'Participation in the United States: progress and barriers', in Davis and 
Lansbury, Managing Together, pp.l73-92; Dunlop Commission 1994. For the UK, see 
Knudsen, Employee Participation in Europe, eh. 3; M. Marchington, 'Employee 
Involvement in Britain: Voluntarisin and Diversity', in Davis and Lansbury, Managing 
Together, pp. 227-240; N. Millward, A. Bryson, and· J. Forth, All Change at Work? 
British Employment Relations 1980-1998, as portrayed by the Workplace Industrial 
Relations Survey series, London, Routledge, 2000, pp. 108-3 7. 
26 Strauss, 'An Overview', pp. 28-9; R: Markey and J. Monat, 'Introduction2, in Markey 
and Monat, Innovation and Employee ParticipationThrough Works Councils, pp. 1-26. 
27 Millward et al., All Change at Work?, pp. 111-12; M. Terry, 'Systems of collective 
employee representation in non-union firms in the UK', IRJ, Vol. 30, No. 1, March 
1999, pp. 16-30. 
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workplaces with 20 or more employees that had standingjoint consulta-
tive committees more than doubled, from 14 to 33 per cent. They are 
much more· common in public-sector, large and unionised workplaces. 28 
Similar trends have occurred. in the UK, except there the incidence .of 
JCCs has actually declined since the·1980s; from . J4 per cent of work-
places in 1984 to 29 per cent in 1990 and 1998.'Survey evidence from the 
UK also indicates that many JCCs are 'not enduring institutions of 
employee representation' ,29 · , .. 
In comparison. with works councils, JCCs suffer a number. oflimita-
tions as a form of genuine employee representation or. voice. To the extent 
that they rely on management discretion in their formation, structure and 
powers, their limitations are clear. Where they rely on agreement with 
unions, their viability as a general representative approach to employee 
voice is also severely constrained in Australia (and the UK and US) by 
the declining level of union coverage and the fact that a majority of 
employees and workplaces are not unionised.· In instigating JCCs, data 
from the Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (AWIRS) 
shows that Australian managers were motivated mainly by the desire to 
improve communication, improve efficiency or product quality and 
implement change, much more so than a. desire to increase job satisfac-
tion or employee morale. This data also confirms that Australian JCCs 
have a relatively narrow range of issues over which they enjoyjurisdic-
tion, although.the important issue of work organisation is that most com-
monly dealt with.JO The inclusion of maiiagement representatives on 
JCCS also potentially limits their independence as an expression of 
employee .voice. 
Survey data regarding the effectiveness of JCCs is largely positive in 
terms of achieving management objectives, notably improved efficiency 
and communication and facilitation of organisational change.3I However, 
this data should be treated with great caution. As Palmer and McGraw 
note: 
28 A. Morehead, M. Steele, M. Alexander, K. Stephen, and L. Duffin, Changes at Work. The 
1995Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey, Melbourne, Longman, 1997, pp. 
188-89; E. Davis and R. Lansbury, 'Consultation. and Employee Participation in 
Australian Workplaces: 1986-95', in Davis and Lansbury, Managing Together, pp. 1-24. 
29 Millward et al., All Change at Work?, p. 110. 
30 Morehead et al., Changes at Work, pp. 190-5. ; 
31 ·For example, Morehead et al., Changes at Work, p. 195; S. Fernie, and D. Metcalf, 
'Participation, contingent pay, representation and .workplace performance: .evidence 
from Great Britain', BJJR, Vol. 33, No. 3, September 1995, pp. 397-98. 
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It may well be the case that whilst managers are usually less rep-
resented than non-managers on JCCsthey may nevertheless take · 
an active role .. in structuring the discussion and the recommen-
dations . which are made. Little can also . be said concerning 
whether the discussion is simply information sharing on the part 
of management or whether it involves meaningful consultation. 
Thus, it is questionable whether· employees are empowered .. ; . 
simply through their ability to discuss a number of issues rele- · 
vant to · the core .· business . and operational functions of their 
· organisation.32 
543 
Palmer and McGraw also note.the significance of the fact that HR man-
agers are the.usual survey·source of data concerning the effectiveness of 
JCCs. Surveys based on employee views of the effectiveness of JCCs 
may produce quite different results. 
·The trends from, surveys were·corroborated by.Mitchell et af.'33 in a 
detailed examination of enterprise . flexibility agreements and certified 
agreements ratified by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission in 
1994/5. They were interested in the impact of sections of the Common-:-
wealth1ndustrial Relations Reform Act 1993, which sought to encourage 
employee involvement in decision-making at the workplace level. The 
Act required as a pre-condition for certification of enterprise agreements 
that they establish a process for consultation over .'changes to the organ:. 
isation or performance. ofwork'. JCCs were the .most common response 
to . this requirement in agreements ( 62. per. cent of certified agreements, 
and 59. per cent of enterprise. flexibility agreements). However, the vast 
majority of these agreements:(75:per cent and.64 per cent respectively) 
failed.to specifyia fixed frequency.ofJCC meetings, and:most did not 
even refer• to the frequency of meetings (64· per cent and 56 per cent 
respectively). In addition,: 60 per cent of all:agreements failed to provide 
for the constitution. of the JCC; and in a majority ofthose which made 
these.provisions the means for appointing the JCC members was not indi-
cated. These results demonstrate a low commitment to!the.operation·of 
JCCs and ensuring their representativeness.··Mitchell·et ·al. further· noted 
a relatively narrow range of issues falling within the jurisdiction of these 
<· 
32 I. Palm er. and . P. McGraw, 'A New Era for. Joint Consultation? Human Resource 
Managers' Perceptions of JCCs and Enterprise Bargaining', in D. Mortimer, P. Leece 
and R; Morris (eds.), Workplace Reform and Enterprise Bargaining, Sydney, Harcourt 
Brace, 1996, p. 182. 
33 R. Mitchell, R. Naughton and R; Sorensen, ~The Law and Employee Participation -
Evidence from the Federal Enterprise Agreements Process', Journal: of Industrial 
Relations, Vol. 39, No. 2, June 1997, pp. 196-217. ·. 
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committees. They concluded that the legislation failed to strengthen 
employee involvement in' decision~making; mainly because the AIRC did 
not implement the letter or spirit of the law in this area. , 
The Commonwealth Workplace Relations Act 1996 superseded the 
1993 legislation, but has done little effectively to encourage JCCs or 
other forms of employee involvement. The Act provides for nori-union 
enterprise agreements, which may offer opportunities for non-union 
forms of employee representation. However, .. these continue to account 
for only a small proportion of agreements certified, and in the absence of 
detailed studies, there is little reason to suppose that where JCCs have 
been formed that they are any more effective than indicated in previous 
enterprise flexibility agreements. Mitchell and Fetter have also found that 
Australian Workplace Agreements mandated by the .1996 Act rarely refer 
to JCCs,34 or even more generally to consultation and information-shar-
ing, notwithstanding their frequent association with High Performance 
Work Systems (or High Involvement or High Commitment Workplaces), 
which emphasise cooperation and consultation with employees. Gollan's 
subsequent study of AWAs indicated thatJCCs were often part of the 
process leading to implementation of AWAs, and that 'employers who 
made use of JCCs or works committees were significantly more likely to 
have had an improvement in labour productivity' ,35 The two greatest ben-
efits from JCCs according to these employers were improvements in 
implementation of change and labour productivity, with management-
employee relations third, and employee commitment equal fourth with 
quality. This ranking of objectives and outcomes is similar to the AWIRS 
95 results discussed earlier, and Palmer and McGraw's observations on 
the reliability of such data remain. apposite here; it reflects managerial 
priorities; relies on managers' perceptions of effectiveness and does not 
necessarily indicate effective employee voice or empowerment. 
The available evidence from a· small number of more detailed case 
studies further confirms the limitations of JCCs, where they exist. 
Buchanan investigated 19 enterprises in the metals and allied industries 
for which in-depth documentation of consultative practices was intro-
duced as· part of the Australian Best Practice Demonstration Program of 
34 R. Mitchell and J. Fetter, 'Human Resource Management and Individualisation in 
Australian Labour Law', Journal of Industrial Relations, September 2003, Vol. 45, No. 3, 
p. 313. 
35 P. Gollan, 'Trends in Processes in the Making of Australian Workplace Agreements', 
Sydney, unpublished report to the Office of the Employment Advocate, 2000; P. Gollan and 
J. Hamberger, 'Enterprise-based Employee Representation in Australia- Employer strate-
gies and future options', in P. Gollan, R. Markey and I. Ross (eds.), ffbrks Councils in 
Australia. Future Prospects and Possibilities, Sydney, Federation Press, 2002, pp. 28-31. 
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1991-96. He concluded that actual implementation of consultative 
arrangements 'was patchy and often transient', that they 'lacked autono-
my from management', and were associated with 'sidelining of union 
representation' as well as work intensification, enhanced managerial con-
trol and extension of non-standard forms of employment.36 McGraw and 
Palmer's case study research into the establishment of JCCs as part of the 
enterprise bargaining process demonstrated that many are confined by 
management to trivial issues, which they characterise as the three T's: tea, 
towels and toilets.37 Furthermore, they argued that many are short-lived, 
and they leave many. issues unresolved because of inadequate provision 
of resources to implement recommendations and inadequate training to 
facilitate effective participation. Other case studies , confirm that 
Australian JCCs are almost. exclusively advisory, rather than enjoying 
substantial eo-decision-making powers.38 
4.2. Employee Representatives on Boards (ERBs) 
We also may elicit some idea of the incidence ofERB in the 1990s from 
the Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys of 1990 and 1995 
(AWIRS 90 and 95). However, these surveys are based on workplaces 
with 20 or more employees, rather than organisations, which limits the 
inference of general conclusions. 
AWIRS 90 found that only? per cent of all workplaces surveyed had 
ERB.39 Five years later this had grown to 13 per cent.40 No significant 
36 J. Buchananand' C. Briggs, 'Works Councils and Inequality at Work in Contemporary 
Australia', in Gollan et al., Works Councils in Australia, pp. 55-63; J. Buchanan, Beyond 
Fragmented Flexibility? The Restructuring ofLabour Management in the Australian 
Metal Industry since the 1980s, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Sydney, 
2000, eh. 9. 
37 P. MacGraw and I. Palmer, 'Beyond Tea, Towels and Toilets? Lessons from a Top 500 
Company in Using Joint Consultative Committees for Enterprise bargaining', Asia 
Pacific Journal of Human Resources, VoL 32, No. 3, 1994, pp. 98-101. 
38 R. Markey and R. Reglar, ~Consultative committees in the Australian steel industry', in 
Markey, and Monat, Innovation and Employee Participation Through ffiJrks Council, 
pp. 358-88; S. Bertone, ·et al., Developing Effective Consultative Practices: Case 
Studies. of Consultation at Work, Melbourne, South Pacific, 1998; D. Worland, 
Consultation in Enterprise Agreements:' the Australian Experience, . Melbourne, 
Department of Applied Economics, Victoria University ofTechnology, 1995; Davis and 
Lansbury, Managing Together, various contributions; E. Davis· and R.: Lansbury, 
'Consultative Councils in Qantas and Telecom: A Comparative Study', Journal of 
Industrial Relations, vol. 30, No. 4, 1988, pp. 546-65. 
39 R. Callus, A. Morehead, M. Cully, and J. Buchanan, Industrial Relations at Work. The 
Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey, Canberra, Australian Government 
Publishing Service, 1991, p. 125. 
40 Morehead et al., Changes at Work, pp. 188-89. 
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correlation was found between· ERB and union presence or size of the 
workplace. However, there were significance levels of 99 per cent for 
correlations between ERB and public/private•sector and industry. 
One in five public-sector workplaces had ERB, twice as likely as in 
the private· sector .. The industries· where ERB ·occurred most frequently 
were Education (54,per cent), Health and Community Services (23 per 
cent) and Communication Services. (20 per cent), .. although. not 
Government Administration (7 per cent): These industries are all domi-
nated by public-sector agencies. Government Administration workplaces 
normally come under the control of public-service departments which are 
not governed by a board structure, but are directly responsible to 
Ministers. Health . and Community Services and .Communication 
Services, on the other. hand, are characterised more by. statutory authori-
ties or corporations which are governed. by boards: e.g. Area Health 
Services and Australia Post. Education is more mixed, since it includes 
universities, which are clearly statutory authorities 'governed by boards 
(called councils), but also schools and TAFE vocational education col:. 
leges which have boards but do not enjoy the full autonomy of a statuto-
ry authority. Strictly speaking, these do not count as examples of employ-
ee representation on corporate boards of management in the sense that 
has been discussed here. Their exclusion would significantly reduce the 
incidence of ERB for the public sector. : · 
Public-sector influences also accounted for Cultural and Recreational 
Services scoring relatively highly with ERB frequency (13 per cent). In 
the sub-section for Libraries, Museums and the Arts, ERB occurred in 23 
per cent of cases. The relatively high incidence of ERB in the private sec-
tor d~minated industries of Property and Business Services (15 per cent), 
Wholesale Trade (13 per cerit), and Construction (11. per cent) is less easy 
to explain, but otherwise these trends are not unexpected. 
Australian governments have instigated ERBs for statutory authori-
ties and corporations from at least the 1950s,, particularly at the State 
governinent level. In 1952 a trade-union representative was included on 
the board of the newly established NSW Electricity Commission. Other 
State electricity authorities followedsuifover the next few years, and in 
NSW the State Dockyard and the railways also included ERBs, as did the 
State Superannuation Board.41 From the 1970s this became more com-
mon. State ALP governments did this as a matter of policy, led· by the 
South Australian ALP government of the .1970~ .• At the federal level 
41 J. Baird, 'Trade Unions and Industrial Democracy', Proceedings of the International 
Conference on Industrial Democracy, Sydney, CCH Australia, 1978, p. 259. 
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ERBs also appeared on statutory authorities such as the ABC, Australia 
Post, QANTAS and the Reserve Bank, particularly under the federal ALP 
government from 1983-96. ·In the last two of these instances, however, 
this was the result of appointment of a union official to a board vacancy, 
rather then the creation of a board position specifically for an employee 
representative. 
! Although we lack detailed research in this area, it is likely that the 
degree of public-sector ERB · has declined in recent years as a. result of 
political' choice ·and· the process of coporatisation and ·privatisation· of 
many public"sector agencies. For example, in NSW the corporatisation of 
the TAB led to a board restructuring which lost employee representatives 
in the process. This occurred in a number of cases in Victoria. under, the 
Kennett Liberal government during the 1990s; At the federal level simi-
lar processes. have seen the loss of an employee representative on the 
QANTAS board. , Some· of this loss of, public-sector ERBs is also the 
result of political choice, in the case of the Victorian Kennett government 
and the post 1996 federal Liberal/National government. The Reserve 
Bank, for example, no longer has an ERB. This case is an indication of 
how brittle the practice is when it relies on the ad hoc good grace of gov-
ernment, rather than structured positions.~ 
5. FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR AUSTRALIA 
The limited incidence of employee representation on boards in Australia, 
and the major limitations in the structure and operations of JCCs, indicate 
the need to consider the introduction of more substantial forms of repre-
sentative employee·participation as a means of building workplace coop-
eration· and commitment.42 ·In the light· of recent corporate collapses· in 
Australia; such as HIH,. One. Tel and Ansett, with' the ensuing loss ·of or 
threat to workers' entitlements, it seems a particularly apposite moment to 
examine forms of corporate governance which both recognise employees 
as legitimate stakeholders and potentially provide an internal corporate 
means of monitoring the activities ofboards of directors and management. 
The 'representation gap' in Australia is~ also extensive, with~ the major 
decline in the level ofunionisation in Australia to 23 per cent, and as lit-' 
tie as 18 per cent in the private sector;43 a majority ofworkplaces have no 
42 · P.J. Gollan and R. Markey, 'Conclusions: Models of Diversity and· Interaction', in 
Markey et al., Models of Employee Participation, pp. 322-43 .. ·.. · ' 
43 . Australian Bureau of Statistics, Employee Earnings, Benefits and Trade Union 
Membership, cat. 6310.0. 
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effective employee voice. To date this gap has not been effectively filled 
by other means, and it is not likely to be filled in the near future. 
For these reasons it is noticeable that recent commentators already 
have looked towards other means, such as European-style works councils 
to fill the growing void in collective labour institutions in Australia.44 
Works councils allow greater opportunities for employee voice than 
employee· representatives on boards, and they· have substantial founda-
tions, in the existing JCCs, upon which to build. ERBs in themselves also 
have major limitations in terms of their powers, their knowledge ·base, 
restrictions of confidentiality; communications difficulties with employ-
ees, and role conflicts. They function· best in association with other forms 
of participation, such as works councils. However, ERBs may be an 
effective support mechanism for works councils, as is the case in the 
German codetermination system. It is possible to identify substantial 
advantages for both employers and employees from a generalised works 
council system in the Australian context. Under these circumstances, the 
support for works· councils is potentially widespread. 
It is notable that eightAustralian companies are covered already by 
the EWC ·Directive for their EU operations.45 These include: Amcor, 
Australian National Industries Lt&, Boral, Burns Philp, Ma)rne Nickless, 
National Australia Group, Pioneer International Ltd., and TNT. Other 
US, Japanese, British or European multinationals operating in Australia 
undoubtedly have EWCs in the EU. This provides a substantial base from 
which Australian unions might negotiate works council structures, and/or 
inclusion in a WWC. It also means that these companies would be famil-
iar with the impact of legislation to implement a .works council system. 
The most effective way in which a generalised·system of works councils 
could be developed in Australia would be· through· legislation. Without 
legislation which defines and guarantees their powers and composition, 
works councils may. not be secure from managerial or union encroach-
ments upon their independence, or at least may not appear to be, which 
would reduce the degree of trust between the participants, and hence, the 
effectiveness of the works councils. Legislation would ensure that all 
works councils have the same opportunities and constraints. Apart from 
its role in pushing sometimes reluctant management or unions towards a 
cooperative, consultative relationship at the workplace, a statutory sys-
tem has an important role to play in ensuring the neutrality of participa-
44 R. McCallum, 'Crafting a New .Collective Labour Law for Australia', Journal of 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 39, No. 3, September 1997, pp. 405-22. 
45 P. Kerckhofs, European Works Councils Facts and Figures, Brussels, European Trade 
Union Institute, 2002, annexure 2. 





tive structures, free from the impositions of whichever party is favoured 
by the balance of industrial power.46 
The German model of. works councils seems the most likely to 
achieve these ends. It is an extensive system which guarantees specific 
structures and rights for the works councils. The decline in union mem-
bership means that the Swedish system of employee participation, based 
entirely upon unions, is inappropriate for Australian circumstances. Most 
importantly, the German system maintains the integrity of works councils 
separate from both employers and unions, thus generating a high degree 
of trust on both sides.47 It would require national legislation, preferably 
with mirror state legislation given the significant 'residual' industrial 
powers of the states. A number of recent commentators have indicated the 
practical constitutional possibilities for national legislation implementing 
representative employee participation, particularly through works coun-
cils.48 
A German-style. system ofworks councils would have a number of 
advantages in the Australian context. In the first instance,. it would further 
the public policy objective of decentralisation of industrial relations process-
es to the enterprise level to maximise flexibility and efficiency. This· has 
been the consensus·public policy approach since 1988, even if it has taken 
somewhat different forms under Labor and Liberal/National governments. 
46 See R. Markey and J. Monat, 'Conclusion', in Markey and Monat, Innovation and 
Employee Participation Through Works Councils, pp. 416-7; McCallum, 'Crafting a New 
Collective Labour Law for Australia'; T. Murakami, 'Joint Committees on Teamwork in 
a British, German and Australian General Motors Plant', Labour and Industry, Vol. 10, 
No. 1, August, 1999, pp. 107-26. · · 
47 The subsequent commentary on the German system of codetermination is based upon 
Knudsen, Employee Participation in Europe, eh. 2; W. Muller-Jentsch, 'From Collective 
Voice to eo-management', in Rogers and Streeck, Works Councils, pp. 53-78; P. Auer, 
•eo-determination in Germany: Institutional Stability in a Changing Environment'; W. 
Lecher, 'European works councils and direct participation: the 'dual shift' as a challenge 
to the German industrial relations system', in Markey and Monat, Innovation and 
Employee Participation Through TfOrks Councils, pp. 49-66; W.. Miiller-Jentsch, .:works 
Councils and HRM in Germany: Analytical and Empirical Evidence', in Markey et al., 
Models of Employee Participation, pp. 272-83; J. Schregle, 'The German Model of 
Institutionalised Workers' Participation in the International Context· of Workers' 
·Participation', in International Industrial Relations Association: Institutionalised Forms 
of Workers' Participation with Special Reference to the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Geneva, IIRAIILO, 1986, pp. 17i-83. · ·. · 
48 McCallum, 'Crafting a New Collective Labour Law for Australia'; R. McCallum, and 
G. Patmore, 'Works Councils and Labour Law', in Gollan et al., Works Councils in 
Australia, pp. 74-101; G: Patrnore, 'How can we be happy at work? Rethinking the role 
oflaw in the 21st century', in Gollan and Patmore, Partnership at Work, pp. 58-72; A. 
Forsyth; 'Giving employees a voice over business restructuring issues: A role for Works 
Councils in Australia', in Gollan and Patmore, Partnership at Work, pp.140-50; Hill, 
'Corporate governance and the role of the employee'. 
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Secondly, there are advantages in separating the negotiation of work-
place change from unions and placing the main responsibility for it under 
the works councils in a German-style system. This means that the employ-
ee representatives who are most directly affected and who have the most 
direct experience of conditions in a particular workplace become involved 
in the decision-making process. 
The German system also maximises employee job security in the 
process of workplace change and the achievement of flexibility' in the 
workplace. In the current Australian industrial relations system the nego-
tiation of. organisational change faces a relatively high degree of resist-
ance from employees and their union representatives according to survey 
data. A major reason for this has been. the association of workplace 
change with job loss.49 However, under the German system the works 
council has some of its most extensive rights for consultation in relation 
to job loss as a result of restructuring, as we have seen. In this context, 
the process of codetermination .is much more likely to alleviate job loss 
and to bring employees to an acceptance ofrestructuring. 
Similarly, · the German works council·. system separates ·bargaining 
over wages from the process of workplace change and the achievement 
of flexibility in the workplace. Organisational change has ·considerable 
potential to affect wage rates as a result of reclassification of grades of 
jobs, changes to skill requirements or the skills mix in the workforce, and 
changes to the productivity, pace and intensity of labour. For these rea-
sons negotiation of organisational change is often closely associated with 
expectations over wage rates from both sides, particularly in the contem-
porary Australian institutional context where enterprise bargaining is the 
main determinant of wages and other conditions. However, whilst the 
German works councils may negotiate bonuses, shift allowances, and the 
skills mix of the workforce, general wage rates are negotiated at an indus-
try level by the unions. Consequently, general wage rates are removed 
from the consideration of flexibility and change at the individual work-
pface. This simultaneously removes a major impediment to the success-
ful negotiation of change and allows both management and works coun-
cil to focus on more efficient work organisation itsel[ · 
In these ways the German works council system would offer mutual 
advantages to employers and employees in the Australian context. 
Employers would not compete on the basis of wage costs, but on the basis 
49 Morehead et al., Changes at Work, pp. 247-55; R. Markey, A. Hodgkinson, T. Mylett and 
S. Pomfret, Regional Employment Relations at WOrk. The Illawarra Regional Workplace 
Industrial Relations Survey, Wollongong, University of Wollongong Press, 2001, 
pp. 285-96. 
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of achievement of genuine efficiencies in the workplace through.work-
place change. Employees would have less to fear from organisational 
change and the development of greater workplace efficiency if it was not 
so closely associated with job loss or variations in wages. Because of this, 
they would be less likely to be resistant to change. 
More generally, Australian employers could benefit from a works 
council system in a number of ways. The extension of employee voice in 
the decision-making process, often where none exists at all, extends the 
range of expertise informing decision-making. It also fosters employee 
cooperation and commitment to the outcomes of decision-making in the 
workplace. Most importantly, a works council system would encourage a 
consensual; integrative approach to important aspects ofworkplace nego-
tiations, such as flexibility, and individual employee cases, which other-
wise are likely to be resolved through a more adversarial system involv-
ing unions. 
Participation be gets participation: a large body of international survey 
and case study evidence now strongly indicates that the successful imple-
mentation of direct forms of participation,. such· as teamwork, quality cir-
cles and Total. Quality· Management programs, are facilitated by systems 
of representative participation such as works councils. so Theoretical 
explanations of the role of direct participative mechanisms of this kind in 
promoting efficiency and· innovative work patterns have • been supported 
by a range of empirical data, such as the recent Employee Participation in 
Organisational Change·(EPOC) survey of European Union countries.sl 
AWIRS also revealed that Australian employers were adopting directpar-
ticipative practices at a high rate; with almost half of workplaces surveyed 
practicing team building and well over a third implementing semi or fully 
autonomous work groups and total quality management. These managers 
claimed that workplace performance improved in 84 per cent of cases, that 
product or service quality improved in 82 per cent of cases, that commu-
nication between managers and employers improved in 75 per cent of 
cases, and that the ease with which change was introduced improved in 73 
per cent of cases where direct participative practices were employed. The 
same survey revealed a strong correlation between representative forms of 
participation- mainly JCCs- and unionisation in workplaces where direct 
50 Markey, 'Introduction: Global Patterns of Participation', p. 9; Murakami, .'Joint 
Committees on Teamwork', op. cit., 1999. 
51 EPOC. Research Group, 'New Forms of Work Organisation. Can Europe Realise Its 
Potential? Results of a survey of direct employee participation in Europe', Luxembourg, 
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Office 
for the Official Publications of the European Communities, 1997. 
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participation had been implemented.52 Gollan's study. of AWAs in 
Australia indicated similar positive correlations between collective JCCs 
and direct forms ofparticipation.53 
The EPOC survey also showed a strong complementarity between the 
success of direct participative practices and the incidence of representative 
participation,·predominantly works councils. EPOC demonstrated 
the importance of employee and employee representative involve-
ment in the regulation of direct participation in order to improve 
both the quality of the participation itself and its economic and 
. social effects. Far from being a barrier to progress, it seems, 
employee representatives are agents of change. The greater their 
involvement, in terms both of form and extent.(and this applies 
particularly to negotiation and joint decision-making), the more 
the indicators of the effects were positive.54 
Australian employers, therefore, could expect to benefit in. the imple-
mentation of team work and other forms of direct employee participation 
designed to improve efficiency and quality, through the introduction of a 
more systematic and extensive form of workplace representative partici-
pation, such as works councils. 
In the German case, the unions initially. opposed the introduction of 
works councils, which were partly motivated by the desire to provide an 
alternative form.of employee voice more tied to the interests of the enter-
prise. Australian unions, and their counterparts in other English-speaking 
countries, have traditionally been deeply suspicious of representative 
forms of employee participation along these lines. The concern is that 
they will effectively undermine union loyalty in the workplace by pro-
viding an alternative voice for employees, even if they are not designed 
with such an objective in mind. This problem would become exacerbated 
for: unions and employees if works ·cotincils became incorporated· into 
management,, which is precisely what unions have feared especially 
because of the relative power and resource imbalance between an 
employer and· employees in an enterprise.55 In the US this fear focused 
52 Morehead et al., Changes at Work, pp. 325-6; Markey et al., Regional Employment 
Relations at Work, pp. 241-2. 
53 Gollan and Hamberger, 'Enterprise-based Employee Representation in Australia', p. 29. 
54 EPOC Research Group, 'New Forms of Work Organisation', p. 204. 
55 Markey and Monat, 'Introduction', in Markey and Monat,Innovation andEmployee 
Participation Through Works Councils, p. 3; J. Hagan and R. Markey, 'Technological 
Change and the Unions', inS. Hill and R. Johnston (eds.), Future Tense? Technology in 
Australia, St Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 1984, pp. 163-70. 
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upon the potential for company.unions which employers used to under-
cut genuine employee organisations in the 1920s, and as • a .result the 
National· Labour. Relations Act ·of 193 5 effectively· bans any. company 
representative bodies.s6 In addition, unions· have traditionally been.con-
cemed with the prospects for 'workplace egoism', whereby employees in 
particular workplaces may be supportive· of enterprise initiatives· which 
undercut broader industry policies of unions, because of atypically nega-
tive or positive performance of their own particular enterprise. For exam-
ple, a firm undergoing financial or market difficulties may be able to per-
suade employees that it is in their interest to accept flexible: approaches 
to industry standards regarding lower wages or extra hours, which would 
have the effect of applying .competitive pressure to other .firms in the 
industry to follow· suit. 57 
However, notwithstanding these potentially. negative impacts, unions 
generally are likely to benefit from a works council system with the appro.,. 
priate checks and balances. As noted earlier the vast majority of works 
councilors in· Germany, and most other European countries where they 
exist, are union members, even though only a minority of the workforce is 
unionised. Union activists are,.by definition, likely to be more industrial-
ly active and visible in the workplace, to have objectives which they wish 
to pursue, and to network more effectively than non-unionists. This means 
that in practice unions may have an indirect influence on works councils. 
The German and European· experience· generally also suggests that 
works councils· commonly work in partnership with unions, especially in 
sharing of data. In particular, . the unions can provide the councils with 
research datarelating to the industry and economy as a whole; national-
ly and internationally, which works councilors would.not ·otherwise be 
able to·access easily. Unions also have the networking capability to link 
work· councilors from·· different firms. so that they. can share data. and 
experiences. ss In these ways unions can actually reach a wider proportion 
of the workforce than just union members; and the relationship may even 
assistunionsin recruitment of members. For all of these reasons German 
::.,'' 
56 See Dunlop Commission, Part IL 
57. G. Strauss, 'Collective, Bargaining, Unions and Participation', . in Helier et al., 
Organizational Participation. Myth and Reality, pp. 126-34; C. M. Frege, Social 
. Partnership at Work. Workplace relations in post-unification Germany, London, 
·: Routledge, 1999, pp. 43-53, 74. 
58 See especially U. Veersma, and T. Tegelaers, 'Information exchange at the European 
level: Unilever as a case study for European industrial relations', in Markey and Monat, 
Innovation and Employee Participation Through Works Councils, pp. 67-86; A. Hege, 
and C. Dufciur, 'Decentralization and Legitimacy in Employee Participation: a Franco-
German Comparison', EJIR, Vol. No. 1, March 1995, pp. 83-100. 
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unions ·are now fully supportive of works councils. Australian unions 
could also benefit from them in the same ways. 
The potential ·benefits 'of a works council system for Australian 
unions were recognised in 1995 by the Evatt Foundation report, Unions 
2001. A Blueprint for Trade Union Activism. It noted the. way in which 
German works· councils ·collaborate effectively with unions, providing 
unions with a tWo-way communication channel linking them with the 
shopfloor or office, a strong organisational base which partially over-
comes the freerider issue, and strengthens. union claims to speak for 
workers as a whole even if union membership accounts for a minority of 
the workfcirce. The authors of the report saw works councils as a major 
contributor to an 'articulated' union movementwith strong central organ-
isations as well as the capacity to intervene in enterprise decision-mak-
ing. The potential for conflicting-loyalties-to undermine union authority 
and produce a 'union-substitution effect' was considered to have little if 
any impact in Germany. However, the authors also noted some dangers to 
unions where the unions were divided on ideologicaLlines and competed 
for members, as in the Netherlands.and France. Here, because the works 
councils can become extensions of this uriion competition, the articulated 
representation of employee interests does not effectively ·emerge, and 
unions may be weakened by works councils59 Nevertheless, this potential 
weakness generally does not apply to Australia because of its more cen-
tralised structure of unionism. Consequently, the authors recommended 
the. establishment of a union commission of inquiry to review the advan-
tages and disadvantages of various models of works councils to develop 
an appropriate model for Australian conditions, but no action has ever 
been taken in this direction. 
The manner in which the division of powers and·authority is struc-
tured between German works councils and unions. may also provide 
wider benefits to unions and employees. Whilst· works councils have 
autonomy over non-wage issues in the workplace, general standards and 
wage rates are regulated by industry-level collective bargaining. This 
means that whilst the works councils maximise flexibility at the work-
place level, there is also a high degree of centralised determination of 
wages and standard conditions such as working hours. In the Australian 
context this would imply a strengthening of the award system, without 
necessarily reducing enterprise flexibility. One instance of how this could 
operate successfully in achieving ·dual objectives is provided by the 
implementation of reduced working hours in Germany during the.1980s. 
59 Unions 2001, A Blueprint for Trade Union Activism, Sydney, Evatt Foundation, 1995, 
pp. 128-32. 
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The hours reduction was negotiated on an industry level, on the basis of 
a standard 37.5 hour week, or 35 hours in the metals industry. However, 
it was left to the works. councils to negotiate at enterprise level the imple-
mentation of this. standard, and a variety of approaches were adopted . 
. These included a daily reduction in hours, a four-and-a-half day week, a 
nine-day fortnight, and longer annualleave.60 Such flexibility is clearly 
of benefit to. employers as well as employees. 
The introduction of German-style works councils into the Australian 
industrial relations system could be achieved relatively easily within the 
existing institutional infrastructure of the industrial relations commis-
sions at· state and· federal.levels. These tribunals are well-equipped to 
undertake the role of the German Labour Court in resolving intractable 
disputes between works councils and employers where the councils have 
the right of codetermination. In doing so they also often establish mini':" 
mum general standards through test cases. The Australian tribunals have 
long. experience. and considerable expertise in dealing with workplace 
issues such as restructuring and even unfair dismissals, which would be 
likely to.arise ifwe.adopted the German system. However, the attraction 
of the German system is that its rationale is to encourage a consensus 
approach to these workplace issues by dealing with them at the work-
place level rather than through unions in a more adversarial framework. 
The German Labour Court; therefore, is only a last resort applied in a 
small minority .. of cases which. represent a breakdown in. the system, 
rather than its normal mode of operation. 
Finally, the overseas experience suggests that training ofworks coun-
cilors is critical for their effective participation in enterprise governance. 
Within,Australia this is already evident from the experience with JCCs, 
and the substantial penetration of JCCs into Australian worlq)laces sug-
gests that a solid base of skills development already exists in this area for 
further expansion: There is also evidence that training for.representative 
participation , overlaps extensively with training requirements for. other 
aspects of employees' jobs, notably teamwork, but also in more basic 
areas such as literacy, numeracy, rudimentary accounting skills and meet-
ing procedure.6I Employers, therefore, would be likely to benefit more 
generally from further investment in this area. 
60 0. Jacobi, B. Keller and W. Miiller-Jentsch, 'Germany: Codetermining the Future', in A. 
Femer and R. Hyrnan (eds.), Industrial Relations in the New Europe, Oxford, Blackwell, 
1992,pp.250-l. 
61 Markey and Reglar, 'Consultative committees in the Australian steel industry', pp. 369-
70, 377; Markey and Monat, 'Conclusion', in Markey and Monat, Innovation and 
Employee Participation Through Works Councils, p. 424;' Morehead et al., Changes at 
Work, pp. 190-94. 
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6. FIRST STEPS 
None ofthe major actors in Australian industrial relations at this stage 
is committed to a legislative program for mandatory works councils: The 
nationally ruling Liberal and National Parties have quite' fixed anti-leg-
islative policies in this area. The' Labor Party (ALP) also stopped short 
of supporting mandatory legislation when ·it· was ·last in power at a 
national level, in 1983-96, althoughjt did support employee participa-
tion,' not least in the 1993 Act referrea to earlier. Even if the ALP had 
introduced such legislation, it is unlikely to have passed: the Senate, 
where it did not enjoy a majority. It is possibk that the ALP could sup-
port works councils in the future, as it has ata State level in New South 
Wales' and South Australia previously in the 1970s. 62 k might expect 
support in the Senate from the minor Democratic Party, which has a pol.:. 
icy supporting means for the extension of employee participation, with-
out specifically referring to legislation for mandatory works. councils~ 
However, if the ALP did form· government nationally in the future,·.it 
could not rely on the Democrats holding the balance ofpower in the 
Senate. 
ALP policy would be dependent on the position of the other major 
industrial relations parties. Neither employers nor unions have policies 
supporting mandatory works councils. Employers have a long history of 
opposing legislative interference with managerial prerogative, although 
they have a substantial history of supporting voluntarist forms of employ-
ee participation such as JCCs. Unions also have a well-developed suspi-
cion of non-union forms of employee·· participation ·as managerialist 
manipulation of workers and as a means of undermining union loyalty.63 
These fears were to some extent confirmed by the experience of the 
1980s and 1990s referred to earlier. Nevertheless, there are signs of the 
beginning of a shift in attitude in the unions since the Evatt Foundation's 
report, Unions 2001. A small number of union leaders· have publicly 
62 Hagan and Markey, 'Technological Change and the Unions', p. 169; G. Anderson, 'The 
South Australian Initiative', in R. Pritchard (ed.), Industrial Democracy in Australia, 
Sydney, CCH Australia, 1977, pp. 155-78; Davis and Lansbury, 'Consultation and 
Employee Participation in Australian Workplaces: 1986-95 '. 
63 Hagan and Markey, 'Technological Change and the Unions'. 
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suggested the positive potential of works councils, and the issue has 
received growing support within the peak union ·body, the Australian 
Council ofTrade Unions. 64 
It is notoriously difficult to import industrial relations institutions 
from'one country into another, and to expect the same positiveresults in 
the new environment that may be apparent in the country of origin. The 
same institution may'operate in an entirely different industrial relations 
culture which leads to entirely different outcomes. As noted earlier, the 
German system of works councils took a considerable time to develop the 
acceptance and trust by employers, employees and their unions necessary 
for its successful operation today. As a system it relies on a high degree 
of consensus or integrative bargaining, but the Australian industrial rela-
tions culture has·. traditionally had a predominantly adversarial· basis. 
These issues have been the subject of extensive debate in ·labour law lit-
erature.65 
Nevertheless, there are clear indications of the potential for extensive 
cultural shift in the Australian industrial relations system. Twenty-five 
years ago, Professor John Niland (former president of the liRA) advo-
cated enterprise-based collective bargaining as a replacement for the tra-
ditional Australian centralised .system of industrial relations based on 
industry and occupational awards of arbitration tribunals. At the time this 
seemed a utopian dream.i 'In 1985 the first general enquiry into the 
Australian industrial relations system for 60 years strongly confirmed the 
efficacy: of the centralised tribunal system. 66 Yet, within three years a 
Liberal State government in NSW· began to prepare for the first loosen-
ing of the centralised system with an inquiry led by Niland.67 From 1990 
Labor and Liberal governments successively·weakened the traditional 
system in favour of an enterprise bargaining system, which today under-
pins the industrial. relations system. Who· could ·have predicted such 
64 ACTU, unions@work, Report of the Overseas Delegation, Melbourne,l999; S. Burrow 
(ACTU president), 'Federation Re-visited - Labour Rights in Australia', address to 
International Centre for Trade Union Rights Conference, Sydney; February 2001; G. 
Combet, 'Employee Consultation in an Australian Context- the Works Council Debate' 
address to Works Councils in the Australian Context Seminar, RMIT University, 
Melbourne, April 2001; M. Foley, 'Democratising the Workplace- Unions and Work 
Councils?', in Gollan et al., Works Councils in Australia, pp. 37-47. 
65 For a review.of much of this literature, see A. Forsyth, 'Works Councils in Germany: 
. Are they ·'Transplantable' to Australia?', in Gollan et al., Works Councils in Australia, 
pp. 135-4. ' 
66 Hancock Report - Committee of Review of Australian Industrial Relations Law and 
·Systems Report, 3 Vols., Canberra, 1985, AGPS. 
67 J. Niland, Transforming Industria/Relations in New South Wales, Vols. 1 and 2, NSW 
· Government Green Papers, Sydney. 
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major changes 20 years ago? Equally, who would have predicted that the 
British industrial relations system would face the changes it does today 
as a result ofEU legislation? 
This argument, together with the international spread of works coun-
cil structures, finds support in Poole et al.'s 'favourable conjunctures' 
theoretical explanation for shifts in approach to employee participation, 
with its emphasis on contingency and agency of the actors.68The first 
main variables that Poole et al. identify in this framework, the macro-
conditions external to organisations, have considerable potential to exert 
a major impact on Australian conditions through the combined process-
es of globalisation; EU legislation and efforts to improve corporate gov-
ernance. The emphasis on workplace-level bargaining and efficiency in 
the current Australian system certainly produces organisational struc-
tures and processes at the level of the firm which are conducive to repre-
sentative participation. Recent strategic choices of employers and unions 
also have clearly favoured the extension ofrepresentative participation 
through JCCs, with all their limitations. The power of these actors, how-
ever, is insufficient to induce system-wide changes without legislative 
support. 
Supporters of a cyclical approach to explaining historical shifts in 
employee participation practices69 would note that in the 1970s industri-
al democracy, and particularly works councils, were a focus for public 
policy debate in Australia, as elsewhereJO Some initiatives were under-
taken by business and governments offered a range of supportive meas-
ures short of compulsory legislation in this era, but this movement was 
not sustained. What happened to these experiments at the enterprise 
level? How successful were they, and why did they fail to spread more 
widely? The answer to these questions is that we do not know. We do not 
even know for sure that these experiments all failed. Indeed, there are 
even earlier examples of attempts to introduce representative participa-
tion in the Whitley Industrial Councils from 1918 in NSW, about which 
we know virtually nothingJI Similarly, no systematic studies have been 
undertaken for the experience ofERBs in State-owned enterprises, which 
spread throughout Australia during the 1970s. Furthermore, we lack a 
68 M. Poole, R. Lansbury and N. Wailes, 'Participation and Industrial Democracy Revisited: 
A Theoretical Perspective', in Markey et al., Models of Employee Participation, pp. 23-36. 
69 E.g. H. Ramsay, 'An International Participation Cycle: Variations on a Recurring 
Theme', inS. Clegg, P. Boreham and G. Dow (eds.), The State, Class and Recession, 
Canberra, Croom Helm, 1983. 
70 E.g. Pritchard, Industrial Democracy in Australia; Wood, Proceedings of the 
International Conference on Industrial Democracy. 
71 G. Patmore,Australian Labour History, Melbourne, Longman Cheshire, 1991, pp. 146-47. 





clear and systematic understanding of the operation of legislation at the 
State level of jurisdiction that requires employee representation on occu-
pational health and safety committees. A substantial record of activities 
in these areas remains to be uncovered. 
The first step, therefore, is to attempt to h!arn from our extensive his-
torical experience in Australia by undertaking an extensive and system-
atic research agenda to discover the elements of success and failure in the 
past.· However,. this. should also. be extended to the contemporary situa-
tion. Despite the broad contours of current practices which may be 
gleaned from surveys,.much more detailed data is required to understand 
the factors which have supported and hindered representative participa-
tion. Systematic data relating to employee representation on Australian 
boards does not exist, nor is there a body of research literature examin-
ing the role and practices of ERB. More literature has been produced 
concerning JCCs, but it remains limited. We need to know more about the 
organisational and cultural environments in which works councils would 
thrive, including possible regional variations within Australia. Apart from 
surveys, this data will also need to be derived from an extensive program 
of case studies to capture the complex tapestry of participation in differ-
ent organisational settings .. 
The second step, which might be taken simultaneously, is extensive 
international case· study research· on examples of system transformation 
towards representative participation. The British case offers a unique 
opportunity in this regard as it moves towards compliance with EU leg-
islation outlined earlier. It is particularly apposite because of some of the 
institutional and behavioural aspects of industrialrelations it shares with 
Australia. Other examples of transformation might also be taken from 
central and eastern Europe. 
Only after the major research agenda described here has commenced 
can the formulation. of adequate public policy take place. This research 
would provide the basis for the, adaptation of a German works council 
model to Australian conditions, which would avoid the problems associ-
ated with simply trying to transplant institutions from different countries 
and cultural environments. Furthermore, this research agenda would 
itself contribute to the momentum for cultural change. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
European-style works councils and other forms of representative employ-
ee participation at the enterprise and workplace level have wide support 
in a number of countries in Europe amongst both employers and unions. 
There is considerable evidence that representative forms of participation 
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help build employee commitment and cooperation; and facilitate 'high-
trust, low-conflict relations' between management; workers and unions. 
In addition, it is clear that representative participation :is also strongly 
associated with effective forms of direct participation which are designed 
to enhance productivity and efficiency outcomes in the workplace. At the 
same time, the decline in union membership . in Australia has created a 
major 'representation gap' which could be partially filled by an extensive 
system of,workplace employee representation. The joint consultative 
committees which have become common in Australian workplaces in 
recent years have many drawbacks iri providing the systematic approach 
to representative participation which is desirable. This is especially the 
case because they have not spread beyond a substantial minority of work-
places, their genuine independence from management is often question-
able, and their powers in relation to management are too limited to offer 
a substantial employee voice in decision:..ffiaking. These trends indicate 
the need and conditions for development of asystematic approach to rep-
resentative participation in Australian workplaces as an important matter 
of public policy .. 
The German style of works councils, operating in. a system of eo-
determination defined by law, seems to offer particular advantages for 
the Australian context. The intervention of the state in this way structures 
an even-handedness which lies atthe heart ofthe German system, and 
fosters the high degree of trust from employers and employees and 
unions which is necessary for the success of'a system of this kind. In 
order to build the support necessary from both parties,·it would be essen-
tial to maintain the clear separation of the works councils from both man-
agement ·and unions which characterises the German system. 
The adoption of this system offers substantial advantages to employ-
ers, employees and unions in Australia, and the existing industrial rela-
tions tribunals have the necessary expertise to provide support. 
Employers would clearly benefit from the·potential of works councils to 
improve flexibility and productivity and facilitate direct participative 
practices such as teamwork, in the workplace. The works council struc-
ture also tends to remove some of the main sources of employee resist-
ance to workplace change. Wage considerations are removed from the 
provenance of workplace change and flexibility in a centralised industry 
level system of wage determination by collective bargaining with unions. 
Employment security is one of the strongest areas of works council eo-
determination power. These same factors offer much to employees and 
unions. Nor would unions necessarily have much to fear from works 
councils displacing their role and appeal to· members, since unionists. 
tend to be elected to works councils in far greater proportion than their 
general membership density. Indeed, the European experience reveals the 







potential for unions to develop strong partnership relations with works 
councils which would enable unions to indirectly reach a much greater 
proportion of the workforce than their own membership. The lessons 
from Europe point to a genuine win-win outcome from the adoption of a 
WQrks council system on the German model in Australia. 
However, before systemic change is embarked upon, we need to 
understand much more about the extensive Australian historical record in 
this area and about current practices. We also need to learn from systemic 
transformations occurring in Britain and central and eastern Europe. This 
requires a major research effort, so that public policy choices are well 
informed. 
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